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Introduction
Higher education that presupposes a specific conception 
of justice do well in preparing students to make claims of 
justice from specific perspectives or positions. However, civic 
leadership students with a strong background in specific 
conceptions of justice are often not equipped with necessary 
skills, dispositions, and habits to exercise leadership in ways 
that can manage political contestation associated with 
competing claims of justice. Marshall Ganz (2010) defines 
leadership as “…accepting responsibility to create conditions 
that enable others to achieve shared purpose in the face 
of uncertainty.” (527) Ganz’s definition of leadership points 
directly to the limitations of justice education that design 
leadership education and development around specific 
understandings of justice. Civic leadership for justice hinges 
on the ability to create conditions that can maintain and 
link public relationships to shared values. Maintaining a 
link between public relationships and shared values is what 
creates the possibility of an overlapping consensus to emerge 
around what is required of justice. Higher education that are 
anchored to a specific conception of justice promote a form 
of moral reasoning that is unable to resolve contestation and 
disagreement. 
Civic leadership education and development, connected 
to specific conceptions of justice, often, consciously and 
unconsciously, encourage students to paint a vision of change 
that relies solely on simple forms of moral intuitionism. 
Moral intuitionism is a type of ethical and philosophical 
reasoning that is not guided by universalized principles, but 
instead “gut feelings,” informed hypothesis, or individualized 
suspicions. Values connected to moral intuitions fail to 
produce conditions that support public relationships across 
disagreement, difference, and political contestation. (See 
Rawls 1999 for a complete critique of moral intuitionism.) 
Moral intuitionism provides no mechanism to order 
conflicting conceptions of justice that emerge from the range 
of value systems, ideologies, cultures, religions, and political 
ideologies contained within a pluralistic society. Structuring, 
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coordinating, and managing public justifications become 
an essential component of avoiding the limitations of moral 
intuitionism. As a result, creating the conditions for public 
justification, in civic and public spaces, becomes an essential 
element of exercising civic leadership for justice. When 
claims of justice are made in civic and public spaces they 
are evaluated against a range of value systems, ideologies, 
cultures, religious doctrines, and political ideologies. Free 
and democratic society requires that public discussions are 
not anchored to a specific comprehensive doctrine. In a free 
society, public claims must be evaluated on terms that a 
reasonable person would accept and not on a unique belief 
system of the individual. 
Public justification is the process that brings claims of 
justice into public. John Rawls (2002) refers to the process 
of justifying claims of justice to others in community as 
public reason. The subject of public reason is the “…political 
conception of justice required of society’s basic structure of 
institutions, and of the purposes and ends they serve” (93). 
Civic values, public processes, communication, and general 
methods of public justification help overcome political 
contestation and build consensus around what is required of 
justice. 
Civic leadership education and development needs to 
prepare not only justice identity development opportunities, 
but also space in which students can consider the role public 
justification has in exercising leadership for  justice. Forms of 
justice education that fail to connect content, curriculum, and 
teaching methods to basic understandings of public reason 
open themselves to the critique that they are politically 
motivated attempts to advance a particular ideological 
perspective. This type of critique can be interpreted not as 
a general indictment of the justice education or leadership 
fields, but instead as a symptom associated with failing to 
prepare students to handle political contestation associated 
with exercising leadership to advance claims of justice.
  Social justice education has become mistakenly associated 
with specific ideological leanings. Failing to teach students 
about political contestation and public reason has led many 
to associate social justice with ideological positions of the 
political left or an inherent liberal bias (deMarrais, 2006; 
Klein and Stern 2005; Rothman, Litether, and Nevitte 2005). 
Conflating contested understandings of justice with absolute 
requirements of justice is problematic. Educating and 
developing students to exercise civic leadership for justice 
involves cultivating the capacity of community to consider 
not only what justice requires, but find general consensus that 
link shared values to public relationships. Individuals exercise 
leadership around the following five core principles: building 
relationships committed to a common purpose; translating 
values into sources of motivation through narrative; turning 
resources into the capacity to achieve purpose by strategies; 
mobilizing and deploying resources as clear, measurable, and 
visible actions; and structuring authority so as to facilitate the 
effective distribution of leadership (Ganz 2010; 2014). 
Making the study of public reason central to justice 
education will help civic leaders create infrastructure for 
community to consider what is required of justice. Justice 
education should avoid assertions of justice that rely on moral 
intuition and are open to explicit contestation. Instead, justice 
education should prepare students to exercise leadership by 
designing, creating, and evaluating spaces that support and 
cultivate public reason. Justice education ought to recognize 
and cultivate a “…duty of civility…” that prepares community 
to consider how to educate and inform the ways individuals 
“…explain to one another on those fundamental questions 
of how the principles of policies they advocate and vote can 
be supported by the political values of public reason” (Rawls 
2002, 95-96). Public discussion in a pluralistic society requires 
a form of justification that separates the particular belief 
systems of an individual from the conditions that a willing and 
reasonable person would accept. Rejecting moral intuitionism 
shifts the focus of leadership for justice from asserting 
a particular position to creating the conditions in which 
community can publicly justify their understanding of what is 
required by justice. The spaces that are created will be able to 
manage and respond to associated contestion.
We propose a framework that helps educators prepare 
civic leadership students to recognize and manage political 
contestation associated with claims of justice through the 
lens of public reason. Our framework suggests that current 
forms of justice education fail to emphasize the appropriate 
content and curriculum associated with theories of justice, 
public narrative, and public deliberation. Justice education 
needs to prepare students to understand not only theoretical 
dimensions of how principles of justice are formulated, but 
also how to design teaching and learning spaces that prepare 
students to engage the public around issues of justice. We 
do not present a full theory of justice in this chapter, but 
demonstrate the current limitations of moral intuitionism. 
The chapter demonstrates an approach to public reason that 
is connected to the philosophical structure developed by 
John Rawls (1970/2005), that can better prepare students to 
exercise leadership for justice.
Context of Justice Education and Civic Leadership 
Development
Relying solely on personal values that extend from one's 
culture, religion, politics, or moral intuition, limits the ability 
to achieve some degree of consensus and shared values 
around what is required of justice. There are many examples 
in the justice education literature that highlight how political 
polarization has created a context that encourages individuals 
to make claims of justice without recognizing associated 
political contestation and processes of public justification. 
We highlight a few examples that illustrate how common 
approaches to justice education fail to account for moral 
intuitionism and political contestation.
  Approaches to justice education that encourage students 
to assert claims of justice fail to connect education to realities 
associated with exercising leadership in a pluralist society. As a 
result, justice education fails to prepare students to recognize 
the role public justification has in cultivating the capacity 
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of community to discuss issues of justice. For example, 
Nieto (2000) suggests that education that focuses on justice 
will be more likely to design curricula that advance the “…
values, attitudes, and skills that teachers need to be fair and 
effective with all students” (183). We agree that fairness, as 
justice, is an appropriate starting point to begin to consider 
what is required of justice. However, determining a justice as 
fairness requirement, as a frame for justice education, fails 
to prepare civic leaders to cultivate the capacity of public 
reason in community that is necessary to overcome political 
contestation and make progress towards a more just society. 
Justice as fairness requirements cannot be a universalized 
principle and order competing claims of justice. For example, 
Nieto (2000) suggests that justice should be measured against 
standards of diversity and effectiveness. If the leadership 
education field were to accept these standards together there 
would be no way to order competing claims of justice when 
tensions emerge. For example, emerging online learning 
technology that adjust content and curriculum according 
to student background and performance might be highly 
effective, but might unfairly track students towards specific 
education groupings that arbitrarily impact their life chances. 
In this case, do we attach more weight to effectiveness or 
to the outcomes that might unfairly track students? As it 
currently stands, most justice education and civic leadership 
do not prepare graduates to order competing claims of justice 
without relying on their moral intuitions. 
Bounding claims of justice around moral intuitionism is 
supported by how justice education is defined. For example, 
Butin (2007) defines the learning tied to justice-oriented 
education as being “…concerned most prominently with 
making visible that contingency of our present situation, that 
we are always-in-the-making of our beliefs, practices, and 
structures” (181). Along these lines, Bell (1997) suggests that 
justice education “…begins with peoples’ lived experience 
and works to foster critical perspective action directed toward 
change" (14). Young (1990) stresses that the procedural 
elements and goals of justice education are to highlight 
how seemingly individualized forms of marginalization and 
oppression are really just one part of larger systems and 
institutions in society. Although assumptions and claims 
made in the justice education field can be supported with 
a range of ways of knowing and understanding, significant 
resistance still exists as claims of justice move toward practice. 
Each of these definitions of justice education provides no 
account of how they understand moral intuition, or how they 
account for political contestation, or the principles used to 
evaluate competing claims of justice. Failing to move beyond 
moral intuitionist claims of justice prevents civic leaders from 
creating the conditions where groups of people can act on 
shared values in the context of uncertainty. 
Our goal is not to discredit justice education. Instead, we 
hope to provide an internal critique of justice education 
that will illuminate a path that will improve the field. Justice 
education orbits around critical issues of the 21st century. We 
feel it is desperately important that justice education cultivate 
the capacity of community to reconcile competing claims of 
justice through a public reason and justification frame.  
Moving beyond Moral Intuitionism
One of the larger limitations of justice education is that it 
does not provide civic and educational leaders a path beyond 
moral intuitionism. Intuitionists maintain, “…there exists no 
higher-order constructive criteria for determining the proper 
emphasis for the competing principles of justice” (Rawls 
1999, 30). Intuitionist theories generally have two features 
that make it difficult to move beyond political contestation 
and articulate positions publicly. First, intuitionist theories 
“…consist of a plurality of first order principles which may 
conflict to give contrary directives in particular types of cases” 
(30). This is evident in the example made earlier that called 
for both diversity and effectiveness to be ordering principles 
of justice. Essentially, the maxims of intuitionists evolve with 
context and create contradictory understandings of justice 
in different situations. Second, intuitionist theories have “…
no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these 
principles against one another: we are simply to strike a 
balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right. Or 
if there are priority rules, these are thought to be more or less 
trivial and of no substantial assistance in reaching a judgment” 
(30). As a result, intuitionists often have no mechanism to 
resolve reasonable disagreement that attempts to determine 
the requirements of justice. Again, referring to Nieto (2000), 
there is no mechanism to prioritize claims of diversity and 
effectiveness when these claims of justice come into conflict. 
Moral intuitionism has no mechanism to single out specific 
principles of justice and no way to prioritize competing 
principles of justice that lead to conflicting requirements. 
The features of moral intuitionism manifest in a range of 
ways in applied settings. The most common form found in  
justice education is common sense intuitionism. Common 
sense intuitionism, according to Rawls (1999), takes “…the 
form of groups applying to a particular problem of justice” 
(31). In the context of education, one group of precepts would 
apply to curriculum and instruction, another group to access, 
and others to racial diversity, public taxation, educational 
leadership, and so on. As the requirements of justice shift 
across different areas contradictory positions are accepted. 
The result is an unstable application of how the precepts 
of justice are applied in fields of education. The inability to 
point to specific principles of justice that would be universally 
accepted, and failing to prioritize conflicting understandings 
of justice, opens justice education to being critiqued as 
including a political bias. We suggest referring to Rawls’s 
(1999) theory of justice to frame the content and curriculum 
of justice education around public reason and justification. 
Rawls: A Theory of Justice
Rawls’s (1999) A Theory of Justice provides justice education 
a procedural approach and method to resolve political 
contestation associated with justice claims. Our goal is not to 
showcase Rawls as the only approach to justice thinking that 
moves beyond moral intuitionism. Instead we suggest that 
his theory of justice provides justice education an appropriate 
starting point to reconcile existing philosophical and practical 
challenges that currently limit the field. The framework 
described by Rawls offers leadership education space to 
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consider questions of public reason and political contestation. 
The framework is intended to move justice education from 
strictly observing moral intuitionism to more sophisticated 
accounts of public reason.
This section outlines the general Rawlsian (1999) framework 
of justice and highlights the three main levels of Rawls’s 
theory: considered judgments (42), the original position 
(102), and the principles that define a well-ordered society 
(397). Rawls’s theory has the potential to make two major 
contributions to justice education. First, the theory operates 
within the contract tradition and is intended to be a strict 
compliance theory. This means, opposed to partial compliance 
theories, this theory is a comprehensive ideal theory and 
provides universal principles that reasonable people will 
accept under the appropriate conditions of justice. Secondly, 
procedural and deliberative elements of this process ensure 
claims of justice are linked to public reason and justification. 
Rawls defines justice as “…the role of its principles in assigning 
rights and duties and in defining the appropriate division of 
advantages (9). The three levels of Rawls's theory point to 
areas justice education curriculum could include to improve 
the ability of education and civic leaders to absorb political 
contestation associated with claims of justice.  
Considered Judgments           
Rawls (1999) designed the initial level of his theory around 
a series of assumptions associated with moral reflection and 
inclinations. Essentially, Rawls assumes that each person 
interested in defining the requirements of justice must 
constitute their good, and ultimately “…the system of ends 
which it is rational for him to pursue…” (16). Rawls argues 
that individuals start their moral reflection at the most 
general level in order to rule out arbitrary circumstance that 
advantage and disadvantage individuals. Individuals’ sense of 
justice is considered and accounted for through considered 
judgments. Although this level of the theory does not solve 
issues associated with moral intuitionism, it helps frame the 
basic element of a more complex consideration of justice. 
Individuals understand that the public reason perspective 
will require them to justify their positions to others. As a 
result, moral reflection and inclination take on an outwardly 
public character. For example, Rawls often refers to how 
knowledge of one’s wealth might influence judgments 
around just taxation. Wealthy people might find it rational 
to support principles that do not support welfare, whereas 
others who might benefit from welfare would support the 
opposite principle (Rawls 1999). Rawls attempts to remove 
degrees of bias from the process by designing a system in 
which individuals interested in justice evaluate what he 
calls considered judgments behind the veil of ignorance in 
the original position. Individuals interested in defining the 
requirements of justice take their initial moral reflections, or 
considered judgments, to the next level of Rawls’s theory. The 
theory assumes bias and self-interest are the basis of political 
contestation. Rawlsian methods are designed to account for 
self-interest in ways that avoid opening discussions of justice 
to direct political contestation. 
Original Position 
Rawls’s (1999) theory is designed to define principles of 
justice that disinterested and reasonable individuals will 
accept behind the veil of ignorance in the original position. 
The veil of ignorance and original position can be thought of 
as a hypothetical thought exercise and method to ensure “…
fundamental agreement reached in it are fair” (11). The veil of 
ignorance and original position creates a space that connects 
considerations of justice directly to deliberation. Abstracted 
self-interest becomes the standard by which rational decisions 
are measured. Free and equal citizens would not accept a 
principle of justice that would unfairly shape someone’s life 
chances when their own position in society is unknown. 
The informational restraints and original position create the 
conditions for individuals to consider how principles of justice 
will satisfy the abstracted self-interest of others. The theory 
assumes that a principle of justice will be accepted if these 
conditions are met and each parameter of deliberation is 
accepted. 
The first dimension of the deliberative framework 
associated with the original position is that the process will 
begin with “…widely accepted but weak premises” (16). The 
ultimate goal of this deliberative approach is to frame initial 
parameters around associated discussions of justice. It is to 
be hoped, from a leadership education perspective, that this 
approach will satisfy intuitionists’ approaches to justice. The 
purpose of this initial stage of deliberation in the original 
position is to present possible principles regardless of their 
likelihood to be accepted. Unacceptable understandings of 
justice will be rejected through the deliberative process. The 
benefit of public reason is that rejection will correspond with 
justifications that reasonable, free, and equal persons would 
accept. 
Once basic considered judgments have been made they 
can be evaluated behind the veil of ignorance. The veil of 
ignorance is a procedural attempt to remove information 
that is irrelevant to what is required of justice. Rawls’s 
construction of the veil of ignorance is designed to “…nullify 
the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds 
and tempt them to exploit and natural circumstances to their 
own advantage…” (118). In practice, this means individuals 
accepting the terms of the original position and veil of 
ignorance do not include certain types of information in their 
deliberation. 
Rawls's theory carefully considers what information should 
not be included in deliberations related to justice. Rawls 
(1999) states:
First of all, no one knows his place in society, his class 
position or status; nor does he know his fortune in 
this distinction of natural assets and abilities, his 
intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, 
does anyone know his conception of the good, 
the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even 
the special features of his psychology, such as his 
aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism. 
More than this, we assume that the parties do not 
know the particular circumstances of their own 
society. (118) 
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The informational restraints of Rawls's original position 
are intended to move considerations of justice beyond 
moral intuitionism. However, over time, the literature around 
deliberative methods and the original position added different 
ways of knowing, understanding, and communicating. Young 
(2002) updated deliberative assumptions that informed 
the production and construction of gendered forms of 
communication. Nussbaum (2013) adjusted the assumptions 
of the original position to include forms of knowledge 
located in emotion. Sen (2011) and Rawls (2001) modified the 
procedural elements tied to the original position to include 
aspects that recognize pluralism and multiculturalism. The 
initial take of the original position also assumed certain types 
of ideal speech patterns associated with Habermasian theory. 
More recent iterations of deliberative civic engagement have 
attempted to expand the modes of communication accepted 
within the original position (Siu and Stanisevski 2012). 
Well-Ordered Society
The deliberative process is designed to produce principles 
of justice that reasonable people will accept and recognize. 
Rawls (1999) asserts that accepting principles of justice behind 
the veil of ignorance in the original position is “…equivalent to 
saying that rational deliberation satisfying certain conditions 
and restrictions would reach certain conclusions” (120). The 
assumption being that the process and quality to achieve 
principles of justice are just as important, and no more, to 
coming to just conclusions. Rawls asserts that the methods of 
his theory will produce the following two principles:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties of 
others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably 
expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all. (53)
The well-ordered society is the final stage of the theory 
and incorporates principles of justice to life. For purposes of 
justice education, a well-ordered society is intended, and will 
have a consequence of supporting certain types of moral 
development and learning. The deliberation process and 
assumptions around moral development ought to ground   
justice education. 
Moral Education, Deliberative Civic Engagement, and the 
Well-Ordered Society
Constructing and measuring the well-ordered society 
against existing institutions is the final stage of the theory. 
It is a common misapplication of principles of justice to 
measure them against a specific issue. Instead, the principles 
of justice should be used to identify what is required of justice 
at an institutional level. Once the requirements of justice are 
determined at an institutional level, individuals can measure 
the gap between how an institution assigns rights and 
obligations and distributes advantages, and the outcomes 
that institutions ought to support. The focus of justice 
education is how best to teach students about exercising 
leadership to advance. Rawls (1999) describes a well-ordered 
society where “…everyone accepts and knows that others 
accept the same principles of justice, and the basic institutions 
satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles” (400). Justice 
education plays a central role in Rawls’s theory and account 
of the well-ordered society. The moral development of 
individuals and engagement with justice is what determines 
corrective measures when an equilibrium of a systems or 
institution is disrupted. Rawls defines equilibrium as a system 
that “…has reached a state that persists indefinitely over time 
so long as no external forces impinge upon it” (400). The goal 
of the theory is to create stable and just institutions. Stability 
is achieved when enough strength exists to “return back to 
equilibrium” (400). 
Table 1  |  Core Areas of Deliberative Civic Engagement and Public Reason that Should be Included in Justice and  
 Civic Leadership Education
Spaces of  
Deliberative Civic Engagement
Inclusive Modes of  
Deliberative Civic Engagement
Consequences of  
Deliberative Civic Engagement
•  Understanding of how to design, execute, and 
assess deliberative civic engagement forums
•  Facilitation skills; Understanding of facilitation 
teaching and learning
•  Understanding of public reason and public 
justification
•  Strategies and pathways to engage unusual voices 
across class, race, gender, and ability
•  Ability to create spaces that allow for different 
ways of knowing, understanding, interpreting, and 
experiencing
•  Understanding different positions and voices
•  Understanding collective action
•  Demonstrated understanding of movement 
building
•  Ability to coordinate broad-based policy 
interventions and advocacy
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Conclusion
Rawls’s theory illuminates toward a justice education 
curriculum that connects structured methods to practice 
deliberative techniques. Exercising civic leadership for 
justice is repositioned to create and improve the conditions 
necessary for community to consider what justice requires of 
it. To improve the conditions in which community can more 
meaningful consider the requirements of justice through 
deliberative civic engagement needs to be a core component 
of leadership education and development. We suggest three 
core areas that civic leadership education and development 
include. 
First, civic leadership education and development need to 
prepare students to design, execute, and assess public forums. 
This content should prepare students to engage questions 
of inclusion across modes of communication, class, race, 
and gender. Furthermore, students need to be prepared to 
manage contestation that moves to deeper levels of thought. 
Secondly, civic leadership education and development need 
to prepare students to engage unusual voices. A key feature 
of civic leadership is engaging communities that might have 
been historically marginalized and oppressed by the current 
systems and institutions. Creating the conditions in which 
a wide group of stakeholders are at the table is how civic 
leadership helps communities make progress on issues of 
justice. Thirdly, civic leadership education and development 
need to demonstrate strategies to make the results of public 
forums consequential. Deliberative civic engagement has 
instrumental value only when public discussion moves to 
action. Table 1 maps the core areas of deliberative civic 
engagement and public reason that should be included in 
justice and civic leadership education.
Public reason respects a path beyond moral intuitionism, 
and a mechanism to prepare civic leadership to reasoned 
to political contestation associated with justice. If higher 
education programs are to become sites of justice, the 
aim should be to develop basic curricular structures that 
cultivate the skills of abstract reasoning and a desire for 
justice. Rawls’s theory illuminates a path toward a justice 
education curriculum that is anchored to philosophical 
methods and deliberation. Rawls’s theoretical framework 
and a commitment to building the capacity of public reason 
can help civic leadership design more effective paths toward 
justice. 
In closing, justice education has several challenges that 
need to be addressed in order to attract, retain, and graduate 
twenty-first-century learners. Educators must establish an 
educational curriculum that is grounded in a comprehensive 
theory that promotes justice and moral development as 
public reason, as opposed to moral intuitionism and political 
contestation. The Rawlsian (1999) framework of justice 
provides educators a starting point for critical engagement 
and reflection, and prepares students to engage in public 
discourse and seek solutions to complex problems with the 
aim to minimize charges of ideological leanings and liberal 
bias.
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